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By Paul M. Pruitt, Jr.
Prelude
King John: treacherous, tyrannical,
mercurial, malicious-the third ruler of
the Angevin dynasty.' John ruled England
and a shrinking number of French
provinces from the death of his brother,
Richard Coeur de Lion, in April 1199,
until his own death in October 1216. One
historian observed: "The legend of his
awfulness as a person as well as a ruler
dates from his own lifetime. King John
may have possessed good qualities-bril-
liant strategist, firm administrator, fierce-
ly determined-but it was his tyranny that
caused English barons to revolt against
him. That clash led to a settlement, a
peace treaty, Magna Carta. Thus, it was a
tyrant king who, forced to deliberate with
rebellious nobles, put his seal to Magna





John was clever and unscrupulous, yet
he had little success in the 13th century's
Game of Thrones. His rival was the
Capetian monarch, Philip II of France.
Older than John, Philip viewed the
Angevins as a constant threat, for they
had acquired, through conquest or mar-
riage, the territories of Normandy,
Brittany, Anjou, Poitiers and Aquitaine.
True, they owed Philip homage for these
lands, but they were positioned to under-
mine his power.3 In response, Philip did
what he could to divide and conquer. In
the I 190s he supported Johns unsuccess-
ful effort to supplant King Richard. In the
mid- to late 1190s, Philip warred with
Richard, with little success. He was proba-
bly relieved to sign a peace treaty with
John in 1200.1
Johns behavior thereafter-notably his
marriage in August 1200 to Isabella of
Angouleme, the betrothed of Hugh of
Lusignan-led to legal disputes in which
Philip, infuriated over John's refusal to
answer charges in person, confiscated all
of his French lands.s Dismissing John as a
"contumacious" vassal, Philip bestowed
upon Arthur of Brittany (John's nephew)
all Angevin lands in France except for
Normandy-which Philip wanted.6 In the
ensuing war, John captured Arthur and
then murdered him, allegedly in a drunk-
en rage.' Meanwhile, Philip, this time,
made a better showing as a commander.
By the fall of 1204, all of Normandy was
in French hands, and most of John's
Norman barons had switched sides.'
Fearing a French invasion of England,
John decreed in January 1205 that he
would mobilize his whole kingdom. Ever
the fundraiser, John fitted out two expedi-
tions: one to re-take Normandy and one
to reinforce his vassals in Poitou and
Aquitaine. English barons balked, though,
at campaigning in a foreign land, and John
was reduced to assisting his southwestern
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vassals with mercenary troops. By 1206,
when he concluded a two-year truce with
Philip, John saw his barons as a dangerous
element.9 In coming years, as he endured
and exploited a religious crisis, he would






In theory, no medieval king could afford
to lose the cooperation of the archbishops,
bishops and abbots who ruled over the vast
landed holdings of the Catholic Church.o ttenti
Richard Coeur de Lion had enjoyed mutu-
ally beneficial relations with Hubert Walter, col
who held overlapping offices, including
those of Archbishop (1194-1205), Justiciar
(1193-1198), Papal Legate (1195-1198) and Chancellor (1199-
1205). John made use of Hubert's talents but resented his pres-
tige. When Hubert died in 1205, John was determined to place
one of his familiars upon the arch-episcopal throne; he had
already clashed unsuccessfully with the Pope, Innocent III, over a
Norman bishopric."
The monks of Canterbury had the right to elect archbishops,
though previous monarchs had exercised considerable influence
over their choice. This time it was not so simple. In 1206, the
monks hurriedly (and they thought, secretly) sent their own
nominee to Rome, but the chosen man blabbed, and John found
out. Soon he was sending his own nomination to Rome, after
securing his election by the embarrassed monks. Innocent was
not impressed. In the end, he summoned more Canterbury
monks to Rome and coerced those at his court to elect his choice,
Stephen Langton, an Englishman who had formerly lectured at
the University of Paris. Innocent consecrated Stephen in the
summer of 1207, but John refused to receive him, decreeing that
anyone calling Stephen "Archbishop" was guilty of high treason.
For good measure, the king forced the Canterbury monks into
exile.'2
By March 1208, Innocent placed England under an Interdict.3
This ban (a doctrinal atom bomb) involved a suspension of reli-
gious services, rites and comforts. Non-offenders suffered along-
side transgressors.14 Unflustered, John continued negotiating
while administering church property and revenues through his
agents. He retained the support of some clergy and a handful of
bishops, and his propagandists spread the word that he was
defending the ancient liberties of the English church.'"
Meanwhile, John diverted church funds to assist with his overrid-
ing goal-retaking the lost lands. In November 1209, the Pope
excommunicated him.'6
Meanwhile, the church was only one of the institutions that
John was bending to his awe. The next target, which fit nicely
with his family history, was the legal system. John's father, Henry
II, had lifted England from the chaos of prolonged civil war" by
ens~onar
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adroit use of his powers-most notably via
the royal courts, through which he
presided over the birth of a "common law"
for England. Coordinated by a chief "justi-
ciar," this judicial system included the
Exchequer, where sheriffs and crown
debtors came to settle accounts; the
"Bench," a banc of jurists often sitting at
Westminster; the court "Coram Rege,"
which met in the king's presence to hear
pleas of the crown; and shire/county courts
often presided over by traveling royal
justices."'
John was interested in the law, and since
he was mostly trapped in England, he paid
personal attention to the courts." At the
time-thanks to the professionalism of
judges, and the reliability of writs and pro-
cedures-the royal courts were much in
demand among small landowners. These
litigants knew that royal courts produced
definitive decisions on important matters: rights of seisin and
inheritance, location of boundaries, possession of franchises.2 0
Thus, the king and his judges stood at the intersection of law and
bureaucracy, to the benefit of many of his subjects. Wealthier liti-
gants, to be sure, sometimes offered to pay "fines" in order to
expedite a case or have it heard coram rege. Defendants some-
times offered payment to have a case against them dismissed or
delayed.2 '
Yet John's barons, the 200 or so individuals who held lands
directly from him, might as well have worn bull's-eyes.22 Not sat-
isfied with receiving church funds on top of conventional rev-
enues, John decided to build up his war chest by tapping into
these tenants-in-chief.23 Consider John's use of the "relief," a pay-
ment owed by the heir of an estate to his lord. The amounts var-
ied by the heir's rank-for example, 100 shillings for a knight's
"fee." The customary relief for a barony was much higher (E 100);
but Glanvill, the legal authority of the day, admitted that in such
matters the barons were at the king's mercy.24 John's demands for
baronial relief were often "far in excess of" 100 pounds. Twice in
1210, he burdened heirs with reliefs of 10,000 marks (over f
6,000). Three years later, he forced John De Lacy to pay 7,000
marks to inherit the "honor" (management) of Pontefract.
Historian Ralph Turner observes that no one should be surprised
to find these barons among the rebels of 1215.25
Barons, as well as knights and town-dwellers, were probably
united in their resentment of other royal policies, too, for John,
as early as 1200, had begun to force renewal of all existing char-
ters and franchises. Each demand for payment was backed by the
implicit threat that the king might sell the privilege to one of his
favorites.26 Then there was "Scutage"-a contribution arbitrarily
decreed by the king and paid by those who owed him military
service. Henry II and Richard had imposed the Scutage 11 times
from 1154 to 1199. John required it 11 times from 1199 to 1215.27
This combination-frequent assessment and harsh enforcement,
plus church income-caused royal revenues to skyrocket. Turner
estimates that John took in as much as £145,000 per year after
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1208, almost six times the money available to Richard in 1199!11
To staff his administrative state, John preferred to employ men
from the knightly class, like his pliable justice, William Briwerre,
or soldiers of fortune like Falkes de Br6aut6, a castellan and sher-
iff known for his brutality.29 Such men served zealously in expec-
tation of advancement.3 0 From John's standpoint, careerists were
preferable to men of noble houses; the latter were more likely to
be independent-minded.' The best way to manage highborn
persons, John decided, was to trap them, offering them high-
priced manors, offices or wardships, knowing that if they accept-
ed, they would fall into his hands. His Court of Exchequer, tasked
with judgments regarding crown debts, was a convenient forum
for humbling the arrogant, blue-blooded or otherwise. True, this
court often allowed its debtors to pay in installments, and John
sometimes forgave debts altogether. In other cases, however, the
Exchequer forced defaulters to choose between confiscation and
borrowing money at high interest from Jewish moneylenders-
individuals whose persons and profits were by law completely at
the king's mercy.32 In the end, incautious magnates were likely to
share the fate of cash-strapped heirs. Most ended up as the king's
debtors.3 3
That was the way John liked it, but sometimes his paranoia
overrode his sense of reality. In 1201, John forgave a debt owed
by the father of his close supporter, William de Briouze (or de
Braose), the scion of a family of "marcher" (border) lords.
Thereafter, John accepted William's "proffer of 5,000 marks for
the vast lordship of Limerick:' more than he could pay. So far so
good, as De Briouze basked in the king's favor, but soon John
began to doubt his friend. Apparently De Briouze knew too
much about he death of Arthur of Brittany. Eventually John ini-
tiated legal actions, in the course of which he demanded De
Briouze's sons as hostages, stripped William of lands and castles
and finally outlawed him. The king's men chased him out of
England, and then out of Ireland, imprisoning his wife and one of
his sons. William died in France in 1211. His wife and son were
starved to death at John's orders.34 John was careful to obtain
token baronial support for these actions. Yet the barons could not
fail to see that nothing was safe-neither lands nor lives-while
John was king.
"Plots Have I Laid" 3 5 :
Magna Carta's Backstory
John was paranoid, but by the time he devastated the De
Briouzes, a number of people were out to get him. This included
a brave minority of barons, who were prepared to oppose him on
ideological as well as self-interested grounds. Such nobles were
scornful of the bureaucrats and mercenaries who had the king's
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ear. They contrasted their image of John's
court, dominated by his familiares, with the
ethos and familiar procedures of the county
and feudal courts. A court of the former
type was headed by a sheriff, magnate or
royal justice, who presided over an assem-
bly of landholders and other parties enti-
tled to be present. The attendees would
hear petitions and accusations, discuss the
laws and customs involved and take or
defer actions. Feudal courts (courts-baron)
were presided over by the lord or his Reeve,
and attended chiefly of his vassals, men
who expected their interests to be consult-
ed when the lord asked for "aids" (special-
occasion taxes) or reliefs.36
To be sure, this template for justice and
government was intellectually conservative.
Applied to the royal government, it would
have forced the king to rule by means of a
magnified Shire Moot or baronial court.
Not coincidentally, in the early 1200s, a
"recension" of the laws of Edward the
Confessor (ruled 1042-1066) and Henry I
(ruled 1100-1135) was circulating in
London; it emphasized a king's duty to
obey the laws and consult with his mag-
nates.3 7 Moreover, the popular literature of
the day, particularly the works of the trou-
badours, promoted a cult of chivalry within
which all knights were equal and honor-







table and King Richard led the Crusade; both fit this image. In
contrast, John, murderer of a contemporary Arthur, and John the
imposer of arbitrary burdens, did not fit.38 In 1212, a plot to
assassinate John was discovered, and one of his barons, Robert
Fitzwalter, was forced to flee to France. A northern baron,
Eustace de Vesci, fled across the Scottish border.9
It was John's bad luck to have his enemies meet in France.
There Fitzwalter spoke with exiled clergy and French officials,
and with Pandulf, the Papal Legate. He presented his case so
effectively that, by the spring of 1213, Innocent made pardons for
Fitzwalter and De Vesci a condition of receiving John back into
the fold. Stephen Langton was given power to enforce this provi-
sion when he returned to England that summer, after six years of
exile, as Archbishop. Langton would prove to be a useful friend
to the rebellious barons. It may have been he who eventually
directed their attention to a long-neglected document, the coro-
nation oath of 1100 of Henry I, in which that monarch had
sworn to uphold the laws of Edward the Confessor. In August,
Langton stopped John from leading mercenaries against north-
ern barons who had defied yet another assessment of scutage.
The Archbishop's argument: the king should proceed against
them through the courts.40
The baronial resistance of 1213 was troublesome, but it hardly
diminished that year's great royal success: John's escape from the
perils of Interdict. He did this by caving-in to Innocent's
demands. In fact, he offered himself as a
vassal to the delighted Pope, who had been
preparing to declare John deposed-using a
French-led "crusade" as his weapon. The
surrender had the effect, wrote Turner, of
"suddenly transforming a stubborn enemy
into an indulgent friend and a potent pro-
tector."" Thus, surly barons or no, John had
gained breathing space in which to launch
his long-delayed initiative in France in
1214. From Poitou, supported by loyal
magnates, mercenary captains and allies
from the Netherlands and Germany, he
planned to catch Philip's army in a pincer
movement.4 2
A decade of scheming, plundering and
rack-renting came to naught, though. The
French won at Bouvines, and John came
home in mid-October of 1214 with no mar-
tial glory, no reconquered lands and few liq-
uid assets. Being John, he immediately set
about punishing his foes, demanding a
heavy scutage of those who had failed to
accompany him to France. These demands
irked magnates who were already in debt to
the crown, notably in East Anglia and the
north. At this point, about two-score of the
barons turned conclusively on the king.
Most resented high taxes and repeated calls
for foreign service. Supposedly, some
resented John's lecherous advances toward
their wives.43 Today, we know that they were
all caught up in a changing feudal order. Relations that had once
been based on "homage" and "fealty" were increasingly financial
in nature." As Sir James Holt once put it, the movement of 1215
"was a rebellion of the king's debtors."45
By December 1214, rebel barons had formed a conjuratio, an
oath-bound body.46 Led by Eustace de Vesci and Robert
Fitzwalter, their goal was a government per concilium, where con-
troversies were settled per judicium.47 They demanded that the
king embrace the laws of Edward the Confessor and the corona-
tion oath of Henry I*4" By some accounts, John had already done
so-in the oath he had sworn the previous year before Archbishop
Stephen, on the occasion of being received back into the church.
Historian James Holt believes that John had simply renewed his
own coronation oath, in a context "which associated secular and
ecclesiastical matters in a single royal promise of good behav-
iour"-leaving the specifics to be determined by force.49
Early in January 1215, John met with the rebel leaders in
London, but nothing was decided beyond another meeting after
Easter. In the ensuing months, John played a masterly game,
promising concessions to church and nobility, and in March
cementing himself in Innocent's goodwill by promising to go on
Crusade.o By the time of the post-Easter council, rebel opinion
had hardened. Not trusting John, they came armed, bearing "a
schedule of non-negotiable demands." John did not appear, so
they sent him their demands. By the end of April, John had
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received more welcome communications in the form of papal let-
ters. One commanded the rebels to dissolve their conspiracies or
face excommunication. Another scolded Langton and his bishops
for taking the rebels' side. Yet John had taught his subjects that
papal wrath could be endured, even ignored. On May 5, the
rebels renounced their allegiance to John."'
The hostilities that followed were quickly over. The barons
failed to capture any of the Crown's castles, but Johns forces
failed to control London-whereupon support for the king
seemed to melt away.52 Moderates such as the warrior-earl
William Marshal53 urged arbitration. John, intent upon impress-
ing Innocent, had already promised that he would not move
against the rebels "'except by the law of our realm or by judgment
of their peers in our court." He may not have meant a word of
this, but he had presented a basis for the celebrated 39"h article of
Magna Carta. Negotiations among Marshal, Stephen Langton
and their counterparts began by early June, at Runnymede.5 4 By
the 10th, John had agreed to the "Articles of the Barons," essen-
tially a draft of Magna Carta. Chancery clerks polished the lan-
guage, and on June 19, the rebels exchanged the "kiss of peace"
with John, who set his seal to the final document.55
Magna Carta: That Was
Then, This Is Now
Legal historian A.E. Dick Howard divides the 63 "chapters" of
Magna Carta into subdivisions, with the first concerning feudal
rights and finances.6 Chapter 2 addressed one of the barons'
chief complaints, reliefs, which were to be assessed according to
the 100-shilling/100-pound scale noted above." More interesting
to modern students, Chapter 12 promised that neither scutage
nor aids should be imposed, "unless by common counsel" of the
kingdom. While this may seem to inject a democratic note into
the proceedings, the counselors in question were "the archbish-
ops, bishops, abbots, earls, and great barons." Still, these provi-
sions represented a distinct check upon the power of the
monarch-an issue on which former writers had seemed con-
fused.59 Future opponents of royal prerogative suffered no such
confusion-for them, Magna Carta was gospel.
Another of Dick's categories consists of chapters pertaining to
"Courts and Justice."60 These include regulation of royal judges'
eyres, requiring them to travel to each county on a quarterly
basis, and to dispense justice in company with four knights
"elected out of each county by the people thereof.61 Other chap-
ters commanded courts to levy fines "according to the measure"
of the offense, adding that penalties should not be calculated to
ruin the fined party. These latter principles were to be applied all
along the socio-economic scale, right down to serfs (villeins),62
which might be construed today as a democratic measure. Most
likely, these measures were twofold in purpose: to co-opt an
increasingly important knightly class, and to afford unfree per-
sons, in any court, the sort of consideration that any good lord
might show them. With regard to his own courts John admitted
to endemic problems, promising in Chapter 40, "To no one will
We sell, to none will We deny or delay, right or justice.63
Evocative as these provisions are, scholars and practitioners
have paid the most attention to Chapter 39: "No free man shall be
taken, imprisoned, disseised [ejected from his land], outlawed,
banished, or in any way destroyed ... except by the lawful judg-
ment of his peers, and by the law of the land." This language,
which marks the dawning of "due process" as a ruling principle of
common law, has had tremendous impact upon modern justice.
For the rebel barons, the effect of Magna Carta was practical
and immediate. Because John had left behind him a trail of mur-
ders, extralegal killings and seizures by force, the rebels did not
trust John to carry out his promises. Chapter 61 of Magna Carta
provides for a committee of 25 barons to advise and govern the
king. This chapter concludes with a promise that John would not
"procure, by Ourself or any other" means "whereby any of these
concessions or liberties shall be revoked."6
Despite these promises set on parchment with his seal, John
showed his mastery of the solemn lie. Very soon he would ask
Innocent to release him from obedience to Magna Carta, and
Innocent complied in August of 1215. Civil War followed, in
which John showed unexpected maturity and success as a com-
mander, so much so that the rebel barons sent for French assis-
tance. By the time of John's death in October 1216, Philip II's son,
Louis, was in England as a claimant for the throne. Opposing
him was John's nine-year old son Henry III, who successfully
turned the civil war into a war for English independence. Twice,
in 1216 and 1217, the boy king reissued Magna Carta. An excep-
tionally long-lived king, Henry III would re-issue the charter
again in 1225, 1237 and 1253.65 His own policies were intended
to regain his ancestors' prerogatives, but his attitude toward
Magna Carta proves that he ruled under the law.6 6
Conclusion
Several scholars have traced the post- 1215 history of Magna
Carta. An excellent treatment is contained in a short book pub-
lished by the late Daniel John Meador, former dean (1966-1970)
of the University of Alabama School of Law.67 Meador shows how
Magna Carta was eventually linked with the writ of habeas corpus
by such foes of Stuart absolutism as John Selden and Edward
Coke. In arguments for Darnel's Case (1627); in House of
Commons debates over the Petition of Right (1628); and above
all, in the second part of Coke's INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND (1642), the writ of habeas corpus was held up as a vital
tool against arbitrary imprisonment, which Coke asserted was
forbidden by the due process provision of Magna Carta set forth
in Chapter 39. Thus, the medieval visions of Fitzwalter and
Langton were retooled for use in a post-feudal world, emphati-
cally so when Blackstone praised Coke's interpretations in his
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1765-1769), a work
which, like Coke's INSTITUTES, was required reading for genera-
tions of American lawyers.6 8
By the middle of the 1 9th century, Magna Carta was firmly
established as a starting point of the process by which English-
speaking peoples achieved free and balanced government.9 The
name "Magna Carta" was so commonplace that Ralph Waldo
Emerson, in 1856, could include it in a list of catch-phrases:
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"Magna-charta, jury trial, habeas-corpus, hip money, Popery,
Plymouth-colony, American Revolution," he wrote, "are all ques-
tions involving a yeoman's right to his dinner."70 In more modern
times, the great charter's name has been a code-word for a spec-
trum of motives and intentions. Consider Justice Hugo L. Black
in 1947, quoting an earlier writer on pro-business interpretations
of the 14th Amendment: "It [the amendment] was aimed at
checking the power of wealth and privilege... It has become the
Magna Charta of accumulated and organized capital'"'
As we celebrate the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta, we
should recall that the original was written with an eye to several
groups: the king and his officers, rebel barons, churchmen in
England and Rome and as many knights and landowners as
could be won over to support it. As a symbol, it has meant differ-
ent things to leaders, jurists and scholars. Like the U.S.
Constitution, it lives in our collective consciousness. Today, as in
1215, it stands for freedom and legal rights, as we, in a democratic
society, define them. I AL
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